If you were waiting to fly out of San Antonio or any other major city last Friday night (13 November 2026), you probably had one question: With this FAA Ground Stop, When am I getting home?
Watching that same ground stop as a former intelligence officer, I had another: What did this look like from Beijing?

First, what actually happened during the nationwide ground stop?
On Thursday, people couldn’t get into Outlook. On Friday, people couldn’t get out of the airport. Throw in the 90-day blackout rumor on the internet, and I understand why somebody might wonder whether those dots connect.
For voters, policy-minded readers, and professionals focused on national security, cybersecurity, and technology, the FAA ground stop is the useful place to start: the Federal Aviation Administration halted departing aircraft as a safety measure after a communications outage in the air traffic control system, not because of a cyber attack and not because of the Microsoft outage.
- The email outage. Microsoft said a change to its network exposed a problem from an earlier upgrade. The company ruled out a cyberattack and brought services back gradually so it could check that each step held. Microsoft’s November 13 statement.
- The ground stop. The FAA issued the nationwide ground stop for departing aircraft after a temporary telecommunications outage disrupted the air traffic control system. Inconsistencies in radar data were detected at 3:36 p.m. ET, and the system was seeing 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds. That router overload caused intermittent communication failures and radar feed glitches in the system, creating safety concerns for the flying public and making passenger safety the top priority. The failure involved older routers manufactured between 2001 and 2006 and a conflict between new fiber-optic equipment and legacy systems. Instability affected 17 of 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers, including route traffic control centers that support communications and radar operations nationwide. About 3,500 aircraft already in the air landed safely, the ground stop lasted about five hours, and the FAA disabled functionality on 60 similar routers out of an abundance of caution before traffic resumed at 8:15 p.m. Eastern. Federal officials reported no evidence of a cyberattack or a link to Microsoft. The FAA’s account of the ground stop.
- The 90 days. That number comes from a Pentagon readiness goal called the FORTRESS America initiative. Military planners want to be able to keep operating for at least 90 days if they lose outside power, water or communications. The plan makes no prediction about how long the lights will stay on at your house.
This is also a story about more than delayed planes and stranded travelers. It reaches into the security of U.S. infrastructure, the cybersecurity pressure China can apply, and the geopolitical stakes around Taiwan, Russia, and how the West responds when critical systems fail under stress.
Now put yourself in Beijing. Nationwide ground stops are extremely rare: the last major one came after 9/11, and another shorter event in January 2023 lasted about two hours. One Friday afternoon, a communications problem held up departures across the United States for hours. If your job is to figure out how to keep America on the sidelines during a crisis over Taiwan, what would you take away from that?
You might start by asking what Americans would be willing to put up with for an island halfway around the world. Then you might look for a way to make us answer that question.

Why would Beijing care whether the Federal Aviation Administration acts in San Antonio or Newark Liberty International Airport?
We know China has done some of the groundwork. In 2024, CISA, the NSA and the FBI reported that Chinese government-backed hackers known as Volt Typhoon had gotten into networks serving American drinking water, energy, transportation and communications systems. In some of the networks investigators examined, they found signs the hackers had been there for at least five years. The agencies assessed that Beijing wanted the option to disrupt essential services during a crisis.
Palo Alto Networks, where I serve on an advisory board, published a detail that gives you a feel for that patience. In one investigation, its Unit 42 researchers found software designed to give the intruders a second way back in if defenders closed the first one. Somebody had thought ahead to what they’d do after they got caught.
Beijing has demonstrated another way to reach systems we depend on. Back in 2007, China used a missile to destroy one of its own weather satellites in low Earth orbit. An American president weighing a crisis in the Pacific has to think about what Beijing could reach here on the ground and overhead.
Imagine China blockades Taiwan. The president has to decide how America will respond. Now imagine making that decision while the mayor of San Antonio is on television explaining where families can pick up drinking water because the public water utility has been hacked and can’t supply clean drinking water.
Even the threat of that second problem could change how Washington addresses the first.

The supplies were still in London
If you want to know how far a government will reach to stop somebody from helping its ally, consider a warehouse in east London.
Inside were humanitarian aid and satellite equipment bound for Ukraine. Men recruited by Russia’s Wagner Group organized an arson attack on the warehouse. British prosecutors secured convictions.
Think about the geography of that decision. The supplies hadn’t reached the front lines. They hadn’t even left Britain. Somebody working for Wagner decided they were worth burning in London. The Center for European Policy Analysis, where I also serve on the board, has documented how attacks like this fit into Russia’s wider shadow war across Europe.

What can we do about it?
- Upgrade, upgrade, Upgrade. Federal infrastructure in so many areas, not just our air traffic control systems, are vulnerable to temporary telecommunications outages. We need to prioritize their upgrades.
- At home, test the backup. I’d ask every mayor a question. If a public utility loses access to its computers on Friday afternoon, can the people on duty keep the generators running? Then I’d ask the follow-up: When did they last try it?
- In Ukraine and across Europe, help take away Russia’s ability to do damage. Give Ukraine the air defenses and ammunition to destroy the drones and missiles Russia fires at its cities. Share intelligence with European investigators so they can identify who’s hiring the next arsonist while the warehouse is still standing.
- In Taiwan, give Beijing a reason to think twice. Help Taiwan field mobile defenses that can survive a first strike and backup communications that people have practiced using. A Chinese leader considering an attack should have to reckon with a Taiwan that can keep fighting and an America that can keep its water running.
National security cannot be a shopping list we hand to parents. I’m a dad in San Antonio. I can buy bottled water. We the people should have a federal and state government that can do the part we can’t.
Related questions
Were the Microsoft outage and the FAA ground stop connected?Microsoft and federal officials said they found no evidence of a connection. Microsoft traced its November 12 outage to a network change. The FAA traced its November 13 ground stop to instability in the equipment carrying communications and radar data, and the FAA grounded flights on November 13, 2026, for about five hours. In terms of how many flights were affected, approximately 9,159 flights were canceled due to the ground stop, including over 3,800 on the day itself, and more than 2,000 delays were reported the next day as passengers and airlines worked through the ongoing recovery before normal operations returned gradually.
Is the Pentagon warning Americans about a 90-day blackout?No. The 90 days refers to how long the military wants to be able to operate independently if essential services are interrupted. It sets a goal for military readiness.
Has Volt Typhoon targeted U.S. water systems? Yes. Federal investigators confirmed that the group compromised networks in the U.S. water and wastewater sector. Their public advisory documents access and assesses what Beijing might do with it during a crisis. San Antonio is the hypothetical example in this essay.